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A Report from the Economic Research Service
Abstract
Organic food products are excellent candidates for contract production and marketing 
because they are produced using a distinct process and are in high demand. This report 
summarizes survey data on contracting in the organic sector, addressing the extent of 
contracting, the rationale for using contracts, and contract design for select commodities. 
The central survey data were collected from certiﬁ  ed organic handlers (intermediaries) 
in the United States who marketed and procured organic products in 2004 and 2007. 
Contracting is widespread in the organic sector, and, in 2007, ﬁ  rms used contracts most 
frequently to secure organic products essential to their business and to source products 
in short supply. Large ﬁ  rms were more likely to use contracts for procurement, and 
these ﬁ  rms contracted for a larger share of their procurement needs. Nearly all contracts 
required suppliers to provide evidence of organic certiﬁ  cation. Firms using contracts 
rarely assisted suppliers with obtaining organic certiﬁ  cation or the transition to organic. 
Most contracts include provisions regarding quality, and quality veriﬁ  cation was an essen-
tial component of these contracts. Prices were determined in a variety of ways and, in 
some cases, depended on delivered quality.
Keywords: Organic supply chain, contracts, organic marketing, organic procurement, 
intermediaries, certiﬁ  ed organic handlers, contract design, certiﬁ  ed organic 
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Summary
Contracts are widely used for marketing agricultural products, particularly 
when buyers seek products with speciﬁ  c attributes. Economic research indi-
cates that, under certain circumstances, both suppliers and buyers can beneﬁ  t 
from using contracts. The production, handling, and marketing of organic 
products follow a distinct process, as speciﬁ  ed by the National Organic 
Standards. For products to carry an “organic” label, their production and 
handling processes must be certiﬁ  ed by an accredited third-party inspector. 
Retail sales of organic products have been increasing rapidly, and the market 
has faced periodic shortages of some organic products. 
What Is the Issue?
Contracts can be designed to provide suppliers with incentives to deliver 
products with attributes desired by buyers. Conditions in the organic sector 
suggest that organic handlers (i.e., processors, distributors, manufacturers, 
repackers), as well as their suppliers (i.e., producers or other handlers), 
may potentially beneﬁ  t from contracts, given growth in demand for organic 
products, short supplies, and the need for certiﬁ  cation. Previous research, 
however, has not investigated the use of contracts in the organic sector. Data 
from two Economic Research Service (ERS) surveys of certiﬁ  ed organic 
handlers (or intermediaries) provide insight into the extent of contracting in 
the organic sector, the rationale for using contracts, and reasons for contract 
termination. Other key questions relate to speciﬁ  c terms of contracts, 
including whether buyers offer suppliers assistance, how quality is speci-
ﬁ  ed in contracts and then measured, how prices are determined, and the 
frequency of contract termination. 
What Did the Study Find?
In 2007, contracts were used chieﬂ  y to procure needed products, particularly 
those in short supply. The next factor leading to contract use is the desire 
to source products with speciﬁ  c quality attributes. Large ﬁ  rms were more 
likely to use contracts for procurement. Assistance offered by contractors 
to suppliers typically included transportation or technical advice on organic 
standards. Contractors rarely assisted suppliers with obtaining organic certiﬁ  -
cation or with the transition to organic. 
Exploring contract use for a group of 13 commodities, the analysis exam-
ines provisions on quality, organic certiﬁ  cation veriﬁ  cation, and pricing. 
Nearly all contracts required ﬁ  rms to provide evidence of organic certiﬁ  ca-
tion. Most contracts included provisions regarding quality, with the most 
common provision being minimum quality standards. Best management 
practices, which can have a signiﬁ  cant impact on ﬁ  nal product quality, are 
speciﬁ  ed in some contracts for nearly all products (except for nuts). Some 
contracts impose a penalty for low quality (typically in corn, soybean, 
and seed contracts, such as those used by farmers for raising crops), while 
others offer a premium for high quality (typically in milk, coffee, and 
wheat contracts). v
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Quality veriﬁ  cation was an essential component of contracts, and the 
veriﬁ  cation method depended largely on whether quality was observable. 
Grain quality has both observable and unobservable attributes, so veriﬁ  ca-
tion consists of both physical observation and testing for speciﬁ  c attributes. 
Because the quality attributes for coffee and milk are largely unobservable, 
nearly all quality veriﬁ  cation is done through testing.
The methods for determining contract-speciﬁ  ed prices paid to suppliers vary 
by product. The market price for organic products was speciﬁ  ed most often in 
contracts for apples/pears, coffee, and seeds. Quantity discounts were part of 
contracts for nearly all products, except for berries, and were most common 
in seed, wheat, rice, and tomato contracts. Flat prices were speciﬁ  ed most 
often for onions/garlic, poultry, and grains. Flat prices that depended on the 
supplier’s past performance were most prominent for seeds, coffee, apples/
pears, berries, grapes, onions/garlic, and tomatoes.
How Was the Study Conducted?
The analysis is based on data collected when ERS conducted nationwide 
surveys of certiﬁ  ed organic processors, manufacturers, and distributors for 
2004 and 2007 practices. The surveys were funded by a cooperative agree-
ment with USDA’s Risk Management Agency and were developed in conjunc-
tion with a group of organic stakeholders. 
Top reasons handlers use contracts
Issues critical for handlers in 2004 became even more so in 2007
Percent of firms 












Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.1
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Introduction
Much of the production and marketing of agricultural products relies on 
contracts to facilitate sales between buyers and sellers. In 2005, contracts 
covered approximately 40 percent of the value of agricultural production 
in the United States, with the remaining share sold on the spot market via 
auctions, wholesale markets, or direct negotiation between buyers and sellers 
(MacDonald and Korb, 2008; MacDonald et al., 2004). Contract usage varies 
across products, with contracting occurring more often for some products, 
such as poultry, eggs, sugar beets, fruit, and dairy, and less frequently for 
others, such as corn, wheat, and soybeans (MacDonald and Korb, 2008). 
Most researchers agree that contracting for agricultural products occurs 
when spot markets fail to produce enough of the commodity with attributes 
consumers desire, particularly in markets experiencing short supply or 
increased demand for a distinct process (MacDonald et al., 2004). In such 
cases, to ensure that the correct quality and quantity of agricultural inputs 
are received, manufacturers and other intermediaries directly contract with 
suppliers (Drabenstott, 1994).  
Several characteristics of organic food products make them prime candi-
dates for agricultural contracts, as they satisfy the criteria spelled out by 
MacDonald et al. (2004): (1) Organic food is produced using a distinct 
process; (2) consumer demand for organic products has increased, resulting 
in an expansion of retail sales from $3.5 billion in 1997 to $22.2 billion in 
2009; and (3) organic products have also experienced periodic supply short-
ages. These shortages may be due to the fact that certiﬁ  ed organic crop-
land, in comparison with retail sales, has not grown quickly enough (ﬁ  g 1). 
Shortages have resulted in empty supermarket shelves for some products  —
milk in particular—due, in part, to processor unwillingness to raise prices 
high enough to clear markets (Oberholtzer et al., 2008). While past organic 
milk shortages were largely eased by the end of 2008, industry reports 
suggest that scarcity of organic livestock feed and grains still persists (Oliver, 
2006; Weinraub and Nicholls, 2005; Organic Valley, 2009; Clarkson, 2009).














Growth of retail sales and certified organic cropland, 1997-2007
1,000 acres
*Excludes certified organic pasture land.
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The analysis reported here is the ﬁ  rst systematic exploration of contract use in 
the organic sector. The ﬁ  ndings rely on data obtained from a national survey 
that was administered twice to collect data for the years 2004 and 2007 of 
ﬁ  rms certiﬁ  ed to handle (i.e., process, distribute, manufacture, or repack) 
organic products in accordance with National Organic Standards. In addi-
tion to addressing the extent of contracting in the organic sector, we explore 
handlers’ reasons for using contracts in order to understand the beneﬁ  ts of 
contracts to the organic sector. The study’s ﬁ  ndings further provide insight 
into the design of typical contracts for a number of organic products, with 
an emphasis on how contracts are designed so that handlers receive products 
with attributes suited to their needs.1 The products covered in this analysis 
include produce (apples/pears, onions/garlic, grapes, berries, and tomatoes), 
grains (corn, rice, soybeans, and wheat), and other products (coffee, nuts, 
poultry, seeds, and milk). This selection of commodities is representative of 
the products purchased by organic intermediaries and includes those most 
often procured via contract.
1MacDonald et al. (2004) provides an 
economic discussion of contracting in 
agriculture, including the risk-sharing, 
transaction cost, and market power of 
contract use.3
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Survey Methodology 
To gain a deeper understanding of the supply chain for organic products, 
ERS studied how organic products are marketed and procured, including 
contracting, by ﬁ  rms certiﬁ  ed as “handlers” in accordance with the National 
Organic Standards (see http://ers.usda.gov/Brieﬁ  ng/Organic/Certiﬁ  cation.
htm for more information on organic certiﬁ  cation). Organic handlers process 
and distribute organic products, playing an intermediary role between the 
farm and retail levels. We also collected primary data from ﬁ  rms holding 
certiﬁ  cates to handle organic products in 2004 and 2007. 
Two Nationwide Surveys of Organic Processors, Manufacturers, and 
Distributors were funded through a cooperative agreement with USDA’s 
RMA and authorized by the U.S. Ofﬁ  ce of Management and Budget (control 
number 0563-0078). The survey instrument was developed by ERS with 
stakeholder input and collaboration with the Social and Economic Sciences 
Research Center at Washington State University (WSU).2 The methodology 
followed Dillman’s Tailored Design Method (TDM) and, in accordance with 
the TDM procedure, all ﬁ  rms holding certiﬁ  cates to handle organic products 
were prenotiﬁ  ed of the survey by postcard (Dillman, 1999). This commu-
nication was followed by a letter from Administrators at USDA’s ERS and 
RMA (dated September 2005 for the 2004 survey and February 2008 for the 
2007 survey) and support letters from the Organic Trade Association and the 
Organic Farming Research Foundation. The survey was sent by ﬁ  rst-class 
mail with a $5 incentive and was followed up by additional mail and phone 
communication. For 2007, $5 incentives were sent to approximately half the 
population.
Different techniques were used to identify the population of ﬁ  rms holding 
certiﬁ  cates to handle organic products for the 2 years covered. In 2004, 
2,790 certiﬁ  ed organic handling facilities were identiﬁ  ed by contacting 56 
domestic accredited certiﬁ  ed agents. Because most ﬁ  rms are certiﬁ  ed at the 
facility level, each facility was surveyed separately, regardless of whether it 
belonged to a larger company or was independent. Of the total 2004 popula-
tion, 1,393 certiﬁ  ed organic ﬁ  rms completed the 16-page survey, representing 
a 63-percent return rate of eligible facilities. In 2007, the population increased 
to 3,225 certiﬁ  ed organic handling facilities. Identiﬁ  cation of the ﬁ  rms in the 
population relied primarily on the list of certiﬁ  ed entities available through 
USDA’s National Organic Program (NOP), but was then modiﬁ  ed using lists 
supplied by domestic accredited certifying agents, as well as with lists kept 
by the researchers. Of the total 2007 population, 1,408 facilities completed 
the 16-page survey, representing a 44-percent return rate of eligible facilities.
While the entire population of handlers was surveyed for 2004 and 2007, 
there is no way to link each ﬁ  rm’s responses over the two periods. As a result, 
tracking changes in handler behavior by individual ﬁ  rm over the period is not 
possible. Characterizing nonrespondents is also not possible, which prevents 
us from making conjectures about the direction of nonresponse bias. 
2For more detail on the survey meth-
odology and for a report of the baseline 
ﬁ  ndings for 2004, see http://www.ers.
usda.gov/Publications/ EIB36/.4
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Moving Products Through 
the Organic Supply Chain 
In many ways, the organic food supply chain is consistent with that for 
conventionally produced food products. Both conventional and organic 
food products pass through many hands as they move from the farm to 
the consumer. Organic products, however, are produced and distributed 
according to the National Organic Standards, which, in addition to specifying 
production and handling practices, require that organic and conventional 
products do not commingle. The standards for organic products are promul-
gated by the Government and administered by USDA’s NOP. By late 2010, 97 
third-party certiﬁ  ers had been accredited by USDA to certify, to the NOP’s 
standards, farmland and handling facilities across the world (USDA, AMS, 
2010).  
The organic supply chain consists of certiﬁ  ed organic farms, which produce 
organic commodities; certiﬁ  ed organic handlers, who distribute, manufacture, 
and process organic products; and retailers, who sell organic food products to 
consumers. With the exception of direct sales, farm products generally move 
along the supply chain with the assistance of a handler (ﬁ  g. 2). 
As agricultural products are produced, processed, manufactured, distributed, 
and retailed, buyers and sellers incur costs and face risks (ﬁ  g. 3). Some of 
these costs and risks are common to all agricultural products. Farm-level risk 
results from uncertainty regarding the amount of output a given plot of land 
will yield, as well as the ﬁ  nal quality of output. Separate from production 
decisions and outcomes, there are costs buyers and sellers incur each time 
they exchange an agricultural commodity. These “transaction costs” result 
from searching for products or buyers, locating products with speciﬁ  c quality 
attributes, measuring the quality of the good being exchanged, establishing a 
price, and enforcing the agreement. 
For conventional and organic agricultural products, many risks begin at the 
farm level and are transmitted along the supply chain. Farm-level risk has a 
Figure 2
The organic food supply chain
Products travel along the supply chain with the assistance of wholesalers, distributors, and brokers
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common component, or systemic risk, which affects many producers (e.g., a 
drought, freeze, or pest infestation that can adversely impact all producers in 
a region), and an idiosyncratic component (e.g., managerial skill or onfarm 
soil quality) that affects just one producer. Farmers can affect product 
quality and quantity of output from their land, given certain inputs, by using 
best management practices and undertaking a sufﬁ  cient amount of effort 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Onfarm output uncertainty may translate into 
price uncertainty for farmers. 
Organic commodities face unique challenges related to maintaining organic 
integrity along the supply chain, and thus may have higher transaction costs 
than those for conventional products. At the intermediary level, because 
organic products make up a small percentage of total agricultural produc-
tion, search costs for organic products are relatively high. These costs may 
increase along with growth in demand for organic products. As organic prod-
ucts move along the supply chain, they must be handled in accordance with 
organic regulations to maintain their organic status. For example, handlers 
are required to keep organic products from commingling with conventional 
products. Thus, certiﬁ  ed organic handlers incur additional transaction costs. 
Buyers, such as retailers, processors, and other intermediaries, incur costs to 
ensure that purchased products satisfy the requirements of the organic regula-
tion. While organic standards likely reduce many of these transaction costs, 
the standards do not eliminate all transaction costs associated with marketing 
organic products. 
Available data on the organic sector provide only a partial understanding 
of the structure of the organic supply chain. At the farm level, 10,903 farms 
and 4.1 million acres of crop and pastureland were certiﬁ  ed as organic in 
the United States for 2008 (USDA, NASS, 2010). The data suggest that 
the composition of farm-level sales of organic products differs from that of 
conventional products. For example, organic produce and milk account for a 
higher share of farm-level sales than conventional produce and milk, while 
organic grains and livestock account for a smaller share (table 1). 
Figure 3
Risks and transaction costs associated with buying and selling agricultural products
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.
Distribution transactions 
costs and risks
Search for needed products
Search for specific quality
Search for organic  product
Search for seller
Organic integrity
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Once the products leave the farm, they are either sold direct to consumers or 
other entities, or they enter distribution/processing/manufacturing channels. 
Data from the 2008 Organic Production Survey (USDA, NASS, 2010) and 
the 2007 Census of Agriculture (USDA, NASS, 2009) reveal differences here 
as well. In 2008, approximately 7 percent of organic farm sales went direct to 
consumers, 10 percent went direct to retailers, and approximately 83 percent 
went into wholesale markets. In the conventional sector, only 0.4 percent of 
the value of agricultural commodities went direct to consumers. 
Organic products that enter the distribution channel are most likely to be 
handled by a certiﬁ  ed organic handler (3,225 domestic handlers in 2007). 
Findings from the Nationwide Survey of Organic Manufacturers, Processors, 
and Distributors make it possible to estimate the proportion of organic prod-
ucts ﬂ  owing through the ﬁ  rms that sit in the middle of the supply chain. 
Based on the responses to the 2007 survey, approximately $3 billion worth of 
organic products were handled by the certiﬁ  ed organic handlers, an increase 
of 17 percent over the amount handled in 2004. Because the survey did 
not have a 100 percent response rate, sales values are a lower bound on the 
amount handled by intermediaries. Of this amount, manufacturing made up 
62 percent of the value of sales; 18 percent of sales moved through whole-
salers, distributors, and brokers; 13 percent of sales were handled by packers 
and shippers; restaurants accounted for 2 percent of sales; and the remaining 
5 percent were classiﬁ  ed as other. 
The next stage of the supply chain consists of food service or retail venues. 
While organic food is available in restaurants, schools, hospitals, and other 
food service establishments, there are no estimates indicating the value of 
these sales. Ultimately, however, retail outlets are where most organic products 
are purchased. Industry estimates suggest that organic food was available in 
82 percent of retail food stores in 2007 (Food Marketing Institute, 2008), and 
retail sales brought in $21.1 billion in 2008 (Nutrition Business Journal, 2010). 
Table 1
Farm-level sales of organic and conventional products
 Organic    Conventional 
Category 2008  2007
  Percent
Vegetables and melons  22  5
Fruits and tree nuts  13  6
Grains, oilseeds, dry beans, and peas  16  26
Livestock 3  27
Poultry and eggs  12  12
Milk from cows  24  11
Other 10  12
Sources: USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2010; USDA, National Agricultural 
Statistics Service, 2009. 7
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Functions, Suppliers, and Marketing Outlets 
for Organic Handlers
The middle of the organic supply chain, like the conventional supply chain, 
has largely been unexplored by researchers. The lack of research in this 
area could be due to proprietary data that describe product ﬂ  ow. Results 
from the 2004 and 2007 surveys characterized the ﬁ  rms that are certiﬁ  ed 
to handle organic products. According to respondents, most organic inter-
mediaries are “split operations” that handle both organic and conventional 
products. In 2007, 39 percent of ﬁ  rm sales came from organic products, a 
signiﬁ  cant increase3 from the 34 percent reported for 2004. In both 2004 
and 2007, approximately 20 percent of ﬁ  rms were exclusively organic. Most 
ﬁ  rms converted or expanded their businesses to include organic products, 
although a declining share converted from conventional. In 2007, 62 percent 
of ﬁ  rms reported that their roots were in the conventional sector, a signiﬁ  cant 
decrease from the 73 percent reported for 2004. 
Most certiﬁ  ed organic handlers manufacture or process certiﬁ  ed organic 
products; between 2004 and 2007, the percent of ﬁ  rms that manufactured 
or processed increased from 65 to 73 (table 2). Further, organic products 
comprised a larger percent of their total sales, increasing from slightly more 
than half to 64 percent, suggesting that organic products are a growing part 
of their businesses. While the percent of ﬁ  rms distributing organic prod-
ucts increased from 20 to 26 percent, the organic portion of their businesses 
decreased, as exempliﬁ  ed by the decline in their share of organic sales from 
20 percent in 2004 to 16 percent in 2007. 
Organic handlers, as “middlemen” in the organic supply chain, both procure 
and market organic products. As buyers, organic handlers purchase from a 
wide range of suppliers, including growers and other intermediaries. In 2007, 
an average of 10 growers and 4 manufacturers/processors supplied product to 
the handlers who responded to the survey (table 3). The number of suppliers in 
3All statistical tests of signiﬁ  cance 
were conducted by applying t-test to 
the sample estimate of the difference 
between the two means.
Table 2
Percent of facilities and sales, by function
 2004  2007
   Share    Share
  Percent   of sales that  Percent  of sales that 
All facilities  of facilities1   is organic2   of facilities1 is  organic2
Manufacturer/processor 65  51  73  64
Distributor, broker, and wholesaler  20  20  26  16
Packer and shipper  15  11  14  10
Restaurant and retailer3 NA  NA 9  4
Other 11  12  9  7
NA = Not available.
Note: Sample size 1,371 in 2004 and 1,333 in 2007. 
1Refers to the share of facilities reporting sales in the corresponding function. Many facilities 
reported more than one function; thus, the percent of facilities column sums to more than 100 
percent. 
2Refers to the share of sales that is organic; the two columns do not sum to 100 percent due to 
respondent error in ﬁ  lling out the surveys. 
3Data were not collected for restaurants and retailers in 2004; these ﬁ  rms reported their func-
tions as “other.”
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.8
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each category for 2004 does not statistically differ from those in 2007, where 
they increased or decreased, on average, by only one or two per category.
After packing, manufacturing, and processing organic products, handlers 
sell their products to ﬁ  rms in the next level of the supply chain. The unique 
nature of this section of the supply chain is made evident by the range of 
marketing outlets available to organic intermediaries, where handlers can sell 
their products (such as cheese) direct to a consumer at a farmers’ market or 
to a large conventional supermarket. Handlers market most of their products 
to three types of outlets: manufacturers/processors, distributors, and retailers 
(table 4). Retailers encompass a wide range of venues, including natural 
product chains (e.g., Whole Foods), independent natural product stores 
(e.g., My Organic Market in the DC metropolitan area), conventional chains 
(e.g., Safeway), and club/discount stores (e.g., Costco). In 2004, distributors 
accounted for the largest average share of sales, followed by retailers (when 
considering all types), and then manufacturers. In 2007, retailers accounted 
for the largest average percent of sales, followed by wholesalers and 
distributors. Between 2004 and 2007, the share of sales made to club stores 
increased, while the percent of sales made to distributors decreased. 
Table 3
A handler’s average number of suppliers, by type
Type of supplier  2004  2007
  Number
Growers 12  10
Marketing or grower cooperative  3  2
Manufacturer/processor 3  4
Wholesaler/distributor 2  3
Agent/broker 2  2
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.
Table 4
Organic handler sales to different market outlets
Market outlet  2004  2007
  Percent of sales
Retailers:
Natural product chains  14  9
Natural product independents  7  10
Conventional grocery  10  13
Club/discount stores  2  7
Total retailing  33  39
Wholesale/distribution 45  32
Manufacturers/processors 15  16
Other outlets:
Direct to consumer  3  4
Restaurants and institutions  2  2
Growers and producers  NA  1
Other 2  6
NA=Not available.
Notes: Use of growers as a marketing outlet was included in the 2007 survey but not the 2004 
survey; in 2004, respondents listed growers in the “other” category.  Respondents that ﬁ  lled in 
“other” indicated a wide range of outlets, including mail order, Internet sales, gift shops, and 
other categories. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service. 9
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Contract Use in the Organic Sector
As products move from one level of the supply chain to another, transac-
tions are either made in the spot market (e.g., via wholesaler or a broker) 
or arranged in advance by contract. In general, informal contracts, which 
may be written or verbal, may be used when it is less critical for the “quid 
pro quo” to be immediate (Hart and Holmstrom, 1987). Formal contracts, 
which are written negotiated agreements, often impose costs or penalties on 
growers or ﬁ  rms who fail to honor contract terms. Informal contracts usually 
persist over time because ﬁ  rms have repeated interactions, have developed 
reputations, and/or desire long-term relationships. Contract sales result from 
various arrangements, including those agreed upon between farmers and 
intermediaries; farmers and retailers; ingredient suppliers and processors; 
wholesalers and retailers; or manufacturers and retailers. With the exception 
of those made directly between farmers and retailers, a contract typically 
has an intermediary or handler as one party to the agreement. In most cases, 
contracts help reduce transaction costs and/or risk (MacDonald et al., 2004).
Survey ﬁ  ndings suggest that handlers rely on contracts to procure organic 
ingredients and commodities. In 2007, 67 percent reported using verbal or 
written contracts for procurement, a signiﬁ  cant decrease from 76 percent in 
2004. The percent of the volume of organic products under contract, however, 
remained largely unchanged between 2004 and 2007 (table 5). In 2007, an 
average of 46 percent of organic products purchased was obtained by written, 
negotiated contracts; 24 percent were procured through verbal agreements or 
ongoing implicit relationships between suppliers and handlers. The remaining 
27 percent of organic products were acquired through spot markets; these 
shares are largely unchanged from 2004. 
Research on contracting in the conventional sector has shown that large 
farms are most likely to contract, and that larger farms produce and market 
a greater share of their output under contract (MacDonald et al., 2004). 
Handlers responding to the survey indicated that this relationship also holds 
true for organic intermediaries. Large handlers (i.e., those with more organic 
sales) were more likely to use contracts than small ﬁ  rms (ﬁ  g. 4) and use 
contracts to procure a greater portion of their input needs. The smallest ﬁ  rms 
in the organic sector had sales of less than $500,000 per year, and those 
using contracts procured approximately 50 percent of their supply through 
contracts. Intermediate sized ﬁ  rms had organic sales in the $5 million to $15 
million range, and those using contracts procured an average of 70 percent 
via contract. Similar results were reported by organic handlers in 2004.
Table 5
Percent of volume of commodities, by procurement method
 2004  2007
  Percent of volume
Written contract  46  43
Verbal contract  24  22
Spot market  27  29
Other 3  6
Note: Sample size 1,393 for 2004 and 1,408 for 2007.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.10
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Handlers may provide their contract suppliers with resources, including 
physical goods (e.g., seeds or chicks) or services (e.g., labor for harvesting 
or packaging or transportation). In conventional farming systems, for 
example, broiler processors provide growers with ﬂ  ocks; hog processors 
provide feed; and ﬂ  oriculture wholesalers provide seedlings and technical 
advice (MacDonald et al., 2004). According to survey ﬁ  ndings, organic 
handlers provided a broad range of assistance to their suppliers (table 6). 
Transportation assistance, while the most common form of contract supplier 
assistance in both years, was offered less in 2007 than in 2004. Suppliers or 
intermediaries were least interested in providing organic contract suppliers 
with labor or organic certiﬁ  cation in either period. 
Contracts may promote long-term relationships between buyers and suppliers. 
For a multitude of reasons, however, buyers may decide to terminate rather 
than renew a contract (table 7). The survey responses regarding contract 
termination indicated essentially no changes in the sector between the two 
periods, and overall, more than half of handlers had not terminated contracts. 
For those who did terminate contracts, it was typically due to quality and 
supplier performance. 
Handlers have a variety of reasons for using contracts. Survey respon-
dents were asked to indicate which factors inﬂ  uenced their decision to use 
contracts. Risk management is one rationale for contracting, and terms are 
intended to ameliorate the effects of risk by lowering procurement costs and 
stabilizing input prices and suppliers’ prices. In 2007, 62 percent of handlers 
reported that stabilizing input prices was a very important reason for the use 
of contracts, while half indicated that lowering procurement costs was a very 
important reason for using contracts (ﬁ  g. 5). The percent of handlers using 
contracts to stabilize input prices signiﬁ  cantly increased between 2004 and 
Figure 4
Percent of handlers using contracts and average percent of volume 
procured by contract, by firm size, 2007  
Percent
Notes: The percent of volume under contract is for firms that use contracts; N=653. The sales 
categories represent total organic sales of firms. The sizes reported contain a fairly large 
number of categories in order to reflect the range of sizes for different handler types in the 
organic sector. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.
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2007, suggesting that price volatility likely became a greater issue between 
2004 and 2007. 
Transaction cost factors are related to search costs, enforcement costs, and 
product quality. In 2007, 87 percent of ﬁ  rms using written or verbal contracts 
stated that securing essential organic products was a very important reason 
for contracting, which is a signiﬁ  cant, albeit slight, increase over 83 percent 
in 2004. Seventy-seven percent of ﬁ  rms in 2007 reported using contracts to 
procure products that are limited in supply, which is a signiﬁ  cant increase 
from 69 percent in 2004. In 2007, 76 percent of respondents reported that 
procuring products of consistent quality was a very important reason for 
using contracts, essentially unchanged from 2004. Procuring products that 
meet speciﬁ  c quality standards in order to meet a company mission such 
as “fair trade” “or socially responsible” was a very important reason for 
contracting to approximately 40 percent of ﬁ  rms in both 2004 and 2007. 
Firms were much less likely to use contracts to encourage growers to transi-
tion to organic agriculture. 
Table 7
Stated reasons for contract termination, 2004 and 2007
 2004  2007
  Percent of handlers
Unsatisfactory quality  22  19
Inability to deliver  17  15
Supplier unreliability  17  17
Failure to produce certiﬁ  cation  8  9
Other 5  5
Have not terminated contracts  55  57
Notes: The data refer to the percent of handlers who use contracts; N=729 in 2004 and 653 
in 2007.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.
Table 6
Assistance provided to organic contract suppliers by handlers, 
2004 and 2007
 2004  2007
  Percent of ﬁ  rms
Transportation 45  38
Technical advice on organic standards  29  28
Onfarm production advice  24  24
Inputs 19  16
Assistance/incentives with transition to organic  14  11
Labor 11  9
Organic certiﬁ  cation  14  9
Notes: The data refer to the percent of handlers who use contracts; N=729 in 2004
and 653 in 2007.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service. 12
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Figure 5
Reasons handlers use contracts, 2004 and 2007
Notes: This chart reflects the share of handlers who use contracts that stated these were 
“very important” reasons for contracting. N=620 in 2004 and 653 in 2007.
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The Economics of Contract Design: 
Quality, Veriﬁ  cation, and Pricing
Once buyers and sellers decide to enter into a contract, the speciﬁ  c form 
of the contract is negotiated. In practice, the actual form of an agricultural 
contract, such as the length, complexity, and provisions, may vary widely by 
the company offering the contract, by product, and by geography. Underlying 
the speciﬁ  c structure of all contracts is an information problem between the 
buyer and the seller, which takes one of two forms (or a combination of the 
two). In the ﬁ  rst case, the seller knows the quality of the product being sold 
and the buyer does not (i.e., the classic adverse selection problem). In the 
second case, the buyer wants the seller to undertake a speciﬁ  c action that is 
unobservable to the buyer, but affects the buyer’s proﬁ  ts (i.e., the standard 
moral hazard problem) (Salanié, 1997). An optimal contract addresses these 
information problems in two ways. First, the terms of the contract must be 
at least as good as the supplier’s other available opportunities. Otherwise, 
the supplier will not agree to the contract (participation constraint). The 
second aspect of an optimal contract is designed so that the seller will truth-
fully reveal quality or will exert the level of effort the buyer speciﬁ  es in the 
contract (incentive compatibility). 
Contract terms usually address some of the following aspects: quality, 
quantity, best management practices, time and date of delivery, prices and 
payment, and actions taken if the contract provisions are not met.  The survey 
questioned handlers about these aspects of the typical contract for the product 
they most often procure via contract. The selected commodities include 
produce (apples/pears, onions/garlic, grapes, berries, and tomatoes), grains 
(corn, rice, soybeans, and wheat), and other products (coffee, nuts, poultry, 
seeds, and milk). In the following sections, the data are explored with regard 
to select commodities to study more closely quality and veriﬁ  cation of 
quality, as well as pricing and compensation mechanisms, of contracts in the 
organic sector. Select data are also included in the appendix, with additional 
data concerning contracting in the organic sector available at www.ers.usda.
gov/Data/OrganicHandlers. 
Contracting for Quality Is Essential 
for the Organic Sector
The relationship between price and quality is often a key component in 
contracts, given that sales and prices of agricultural products are typically 
contingent on quality (Waugh, 1928). This relationship creates a conﬂ  ict 
between buyers and sellers because, while buyers are generally willing to pay 
higher prices for higher quality, producers (all else equal) usually must incur 
greater costs to produce higher quality products. Quality veriﬁ  cation is essen-
tial, because when buyers cannot observe quality, producers are unwilling 
to undertake needed activities to sell high-quality products, resulting in 
low-quality merchandise being sold in the marketplace (Akerlof, 1970). This 
phenomenon has been observed repeatedly in agricultural markets and has 
led to the legislation of Federal grades, standards, and quality inspections for 
fruits, vegetables, and grains (Dimitri, 2002). Two separate contracting issues 
are related to quality: how to structure incentives so that the desired quality 
will be produced; and how to observe or measure quality. 14
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Encouraging suppliers to deliver high-quality products can be done by 
linking price with delivered quality, by placing production and handling 
requirements on suppliers, or by a combination of both. The importance of 
quality to organic buyers is readily apparent by the dominance of quality 
provisions in contracts; nearly all contracts include quality provisions (table 
8). Minimum quality standards for delivered quality, which set a lower bound 
on quality so that anything delivered below this level will be rejected by the 
buyer, appear with the greatest frequency. In 2007, grain contracts speciﬁ  ed a 
minimum quality standard most often. Over three-quarters of handlers indi-
cated that their seed, milk, onions/garlic, wheat, soybeans, corn, and grape 
contracts speciﬁ  ed minimum quality standards.
In addition to setting a minimum quality, contract provisions often tie 
price and quality by offering incentives for high quality or penalties for 
low quality. Incentives for high quality typically take one of two forms: a 
premium for high quality output; or a two-part price, where the price has a 
ﬁ  xed component and a component that increases with quality. In the organic 
market, buyers tend to offer a price premium for high quality. Other contracts 
penalize a supplier for delivering a low-quality product. Some products are 
more likely to be penalized for low quality (e.g., corn, soybeans, and toma-
toes), while others are more likely to offer a premium for high quality (e.g., 
milk, coffee, and wheat). Nearly all survey respondents indicated that their 
contracts did not explicitly set prices as a ﬁ  xed price plus a variable compo-
nent that explicitly depends on quality. 
Table 8
Quality provisions in contracts with organic suppliers, select commodities, 2004 and 2007
  Minimum quality   Premium  Penalty  Best management
  standards  for high quality  for low quality  practices
Product  2004 2007  2004  2007 2004  2007  2004  2007
  Percent of handlers that use contracts
Produce:
Apples/pears  72  46  31  15 37 19  19 23
Berries  73  64  9  21 18 21  20 14
Grapes  64  79  22  26 42 26  37 37
Onions/garlic  100  85  17  38 67 31  40 15
Tomatoes  75  67  27  33 30 50  17 17
Grains:
Corn  78  80  26  10 39 39  30 22
Rice  77  71  21  18 21 12  23 24
Soybeans  87  84  27  19 36 30  13 19
Wheat  85  85  54  41 44 15  13 11
Other:
Coffee 73  54  38  38  11  *  16  15
Nuts 81  71  24  21  30  25  25  *
Poultry  50  64  22  * 33 14  44 21
Milk  73  78  34  43 21 30  23 17
Seeds  88  80  24  27 52 33  30 20
All  products  78  67  27  21 29 20  23 18
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.15
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Some contracts include stronger provisions intended to control quality 
through adoption of best management practices. While exact practices 
vary by region and crop, best management practices cover many aspects of 
farming, including soil, water, and pest management, to increase output, 
reduce costs, minimize environmental pollution, or increase quality (Hassell 
et al., 2005; Daane et al., 2005). From a contracting perspective, contracts 
that provide a large amount of risk-sharing often remove farmer incentives 
to undertake good management practices, and specifying best management 
practices may be an effort to offset  this effect (MacDonald et al., 2004). 
According to survey ﬁ  ndings, best management practices were part of all 
contracts for all commodities except those for nuts, but were used most often 
in contracts for grapes and rice, followed by apples/pears, corn, and poultry. 
Quality Veriﬁ  cation in Contracts 
With Organic Suppliers
Veriﬁ  cation of quality ensures that the delivered product meets the stan-
dards speciﬁ  ed in the contract and is an essential part of contracts. Thus, 
contracts that contain provisions relating to quality also stipulate the method 
of veriﬁ  cation. The timing of quality measurement, as well as the veriﬁ  cation 
method, varies widely in the organic sector. In many cases, buyers observe or 
measure quality prior to paying for a delivery. Even when quality is observ-
able, however, ascertaining quality of an entire delivery is cost prohibitive. 
While most ﬁ  rms test a sample of the delivered product, this method is prone 
to measurement error (Hueth et al., 1999). At times, when quality characteris-
tics are not perceivable until the commodity has traveled farther downstream, 
quality measurement occurs after delivery (Hueth and Ligon, 1999).
The quality measurement technique depends on how suppliers and handlers 
deﬁ  ne quality. For some products (e.g., apples), quality is deﬁ  ned by size, 
color, and freedom from visible blemishes. When attributes of quality can be 
observed, the buyer can evaluate samples at the time of delivery. Quality of 
wheat and specialty grains, however, maybe be deﬁ  ned by moisture, protein, 
or fat content. In such cases, quality is unobservable, so quality veriﬁ  cation 
requires that samples of the product be tested. Some products may have quali-
ties deﬁ  ned by both observable and unobservable attributes, so quality veriﬁ  -
cation may require a combination of observation and testing. In other cases, 
when attributes cannot be measured even with testing, (e.g., cocoa labeled 
“fair trade,” tuna labeled “dolphin friendly,” or products labeled “organic”), a 
buyer may require third-party certiﬁ  cation of the supplier’s process to ensure 
quality standards are satisﬁ  ed. 
The most commonly used quality measurement provisions are presented 
in table 9 for select commodities. Nearly all contracts specify that the 
supplier provide the buyer with a copy of an organic inspection certiﬁ  -
cate. The organic certiﬁ  cate ensures that the seller and the buyer are 
exchanging a product that satisﬁ  es the national organic standards and 
means that the product was produced on a farm that was certiﬁ  ed organic 
by a USDA-accredited certifying agent and processed and distributed by 
an organic handler with similar certiﬁ  cation. Handlers may also request 
third-party certiﬁ  cation for other quality attributes, such as for “fair 
trade” or “kosher” attributes. 16
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USDA grading standards, which provide a shorthand deﬁ  nition for quality, 
were used more frequently for some crops in 2007 (e.g., rice, onions/garlic, 
apples/pears, nuts, and poultry) than for others, reﬂ  ecting the importance of 
their usage for conventional crops. Conventional rice sales, for example, often 
rely on USDA grades. 
For most agricultural products (including those raised and handled under 
organic management), quality veriﬁ  cation relies on both observation and 
testing. Fresh produce relies equally on observing quality and testing quality, 
likely because many quality attributes for fruits and vegetables can be readily 
observed. Grain quality has both observable and unobservable attributes of 
quality. As a result, the deﬁ  nition of grain quality is complex, where veriﬁ  ca-
tion consists of observation for some attributes and testing for others. Wheat 
quality, for example, depends on a number of visible attributes, such as the 
amount of shrunken and/or broken kernels and heat-damaged kernels, the 
presence of foreign material, smut damage, insect damage, frost damage, 
germ damage, and mold damage. Unobservable quality attributes, such as 
moisture, protein content, weight, and kernel hardness, can also be tested 
using equipment developed speciﬁ  cally for this purpose. Contracts often 
include speciﬁ  cations for such attributes (U.S. Wheat Associates, 2007). 
Because quality attributes for coffee and milk are largely unobservable, 
nearly all quality veriﬁ  cation is done through testing. Coffee bean quality is 
tested at both the green stage and the roasted stage. Quality tests include a 
cup test, which considers brewed coffee aroma and ﬂ  avor; a roast test, which 
Table 9
Verifying quality for select commodities in contracts with organic suppliers, 2004 and 2007
     Third-party      Organic
  Observation  Testing  certiﬁ  cation  USDA grades  certiﬁ  cate
Product  2004  2007 2004  2007  2004 2007  2004 2007  2004  2007
  Percent of handlers that use contracts
Produce:
Apples/pears  67  50 55  46 9 31  21 42  71  65
Berries  45  71  73 57  27  21 18  29 82 79
Grapes  17  37  61 58  0  21 26  21 77 89
Onions/garlic  50  62  33 46  17  15 17  46 83 85
Tomatoes  57  44  43 56  13  22 35  17 91 83
Grains:
Corn  57  59  61 76  37  27 46  29 88 93
Rice  64  47  50 82  21  35 36  47 85 82
Soybeans  71  68  83 70  36  35 24  24 89 95
Wheat  39  59  78 78  22  30 36  30 97 85
Other:
Coffee  66  46  78 85  36  27 11  * 83 75
Nuts  64  46  45 46  27  17 50  38 73 88
Poultry  38  57  38 43  13  29 50  36 75 86
Seeds  50  53  65 80  15  53 19  13 71 87
Milk  33  22 69  74  24  *  11 13  78  87
All  products  56  52  62 63  26  24 25  23 84 82
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers that use contracts reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term.
Notes: Third-party certiﬁ  cation differs from providing an organic certiﬁ  cate. Third-party certiﬁ  cation covers attributes of quality other than 
“organic,” while the organic certiﬁ  cate covers only the attribute “organic.” 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service. 17
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indicates whether the coffee was roasted at the proper temperature; and a 
measure for moisture content (Coffee Quality Institute, 2009). Assessing 
milk quality involves analyzing the milk for fat and nonfat milk solids, gath-
ering somatic cell counts, and testing for various residues (FDA, 2009). Milk 
quality tests are based on samples taken on farm or from milk products after 
they have been processed or manufactured. 
Pricing and Compensation in Contracts 
With Organic Suppliers
A crucial part of the contract is supplier compensation, which includes how 
prices are determined and the timing of payment. An appropriately set price 
will keep the buyer and the seller from breaking the contract and using the 
spot market to buy or sell their products. Optimal contract theory indicates 
that, at a minimum, a contract needs to compensate a supplier by at least as 
much as the next best alternative. In some cases, buyers will try to cultivate 
long-term relationships with growers through the contract and price speciﬁ  -
cation. While some prices are ﬁ  xed at a ﬂ  at rate in advance, pricing can be 
more complex and can be calculated in a variety of ways, such as equal to 
market prices or dependent on a supplier’s past performance. Past perfor-
mance generally inﬂ  uences current prices when the buyer and seller have 
an established long-term relationship or when it is costly for the supplier to 
switch from one crop to another (Fama, 1990). Performance-based pricing 
provides the supplier with some risk sharing and, by basing current prices on 
past performance, a supplier will not be severely punished for a bad crop in 
the current year.
Pricing can be structured in many ways, and there is no dominant method 
of price determination in the organic sector. Contracts between different 
pairs of suppliers and buyers, even for the same product, likely specify prices 
in several ways. The timing of payment varies, as well, with the two most 
common provisions specifying that the supplier is paid on delivery or after a 
speciﬁ  ed number of days. In 2007, prices were negotiated at the time of trans-
action (versus in advance when the contract is signed) most often for organic 
soybeans, wheat, berries, and nuts. The provision that suppliers receive the 
market price for organic products at the time of delivery is speciﬁ  ed most 
often in contracts for apples/pears, coffee, and seeds (table 10). By commit-
ting in advance to the market price, the supplier does not have an incentive to 
breach the contract and sell the product in the market. Quantity discounts—
receiving a lower price in exchange for the purchase of a large quantity—are 
part of contracts for nearly all products except for organic berries and are 
most common in organic seed, wheat, rice, and tomato contracts. 
Flat prices (i.e., those that do not explicitly vary with quantity or quality) 
are speciﬁ  ed most often in contracts for organic onions/garlic, poultry, and 
grains. The least frequently used price mechanism is one linking prices to 
the supplier’s past performance, which rewards suppliers for consistently 
delivering high-quality products to the handler. This provision most often 
covers organic seeds, coffee, apples/pears, berries, grapes, onions/garlic, 
and tomatoes. These products have characteristics that encourage long-term 
relationships between suppliers and buyers. For example, coffee, berry, grape, 
and apple/pear production occurs on perennial plants or trees and represents 18
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a long-term investment for growers. In such cases, growers often prefer long-
term relationships with buyers. Prices that consider a supplier’s production 
history will encourage that relationship. While onions/garlic and tomatoes 
are annual crops, their production requires a high level of skill, particularly 
for processing varieties, so buyers are willing to compensate their long-term 
providers based on past performance. 
Nearly all contracts specify that payment be made to suppliers after a speci-
ﬁ  ed number of days for all products, except for soybeans and poultry when 
payment is made at the time of delivery.
Table 10
Handlers’ use of compensation clauses in contracts with organic suppliers 
for select commodities, 2004 and 2007
    Organic  Negotiated at time   Prices based on  Quantity
  Flat price  market price  of transaction  past performance  discount
Product  2004  2007 2004  2007  2004 2007  2004 2007  2004  2007
  Percent of handlers that use contracts
Produce:
Apples/pears 16  12  NA  65  44  *  *  *  22  15
Berries 36  14  NA  29  64  36  *  14  *  *
Grapes  43  26  NA 21  17  21 11  26 10  *
Onions/garlic 33  54  NA  15  17  15  *  23  33  15
Tomatoes 35  22  NA  33  35  22  *  17  23  33
Grains:
Corn  56  39  NA 32  27  24 14  * 36 24
Rice 43  47  NA  24  29  29  *  *  21  35
Soybeans  45  32  NA 27  35  41 17  * 28 11
Wheat  38  33  NA 30  41  37 13  * 12 44
Other:
Coffee  18  13  NA 47  40  24 15  10 30 18
Nuts 32  29  NA  13  27  33  *  *  19  25
Poultry  25  43  NA 29  13  * 11  * 11 21
Seeds  67  *  NA 40  11  27 21  13 20 47
Milk 44  22  NA  17  23  13  *  *  16  *
All  products  40  30  NA 30  32  23 11  * 26 22
NA=Not available.
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers who use contracts reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term.
Note: The 2004 survey instrument did not ask handlers to report whether contracts included a price clause for organic market price. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.19
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Conclusions: Contracts in the 
Organic Sector 
This report provides the ﬁ  rst systematic exploration of contract use in the 
organic sector, assessing the extent of contracting in the organic sector and 
providing insight into contract design for different organic commodities. The 
ﬁ  ndings indicate that there is widespread use of contracting in the organic 
sector and that securing supplies of a highly differentiated product is less 
costly when using contracts than when relying on the spot market.  Most 
contracts include quality standards and speciﬁ  c quality testing protocol; 
these provisions are similar to those included in contracts for conventionally 
produced agricultural commodities. 
This report does not address the controversy over contract use in the 
conventional sector, where processor market power over suppliers is an 
issue, particularly in the livestock sector. While the source of tension 
between processors and suppliers in some conventional sectors is not fully 
understood, economic research suggests that the link between contracts 
and market power is weak (MacDonald et al., 2004). At the time this report 
was written, evidence did not indicate such concerns in the organic sector. 
Nontheless, the research and survey instrument did not directly address 
market power in the organic sector. 
While there was a decline in the percent of handlers using contracts between 
2004 and 2007, the average percent of volume procured under contract 
remained constant. We hypothesized that as the market grows and competi-
tion for scarce products increases, more handlers would rely on contracts and 
a greater share of volume would be procured under contract. This contradic-
tion could be the result of respondent bias in the data, but also that suppliers 
may be less willing to agree to contracts if selling their products will be 
more proﬁ  table on the spot market. Missing data on prices and product avail-
ability would allow for analysis of this question, as would information on 
why organic suppliers use contracts, providing a comparative analysis that 
identiﬁ  es which factors lead to the use of contracts in general, and whether 
measurable differences exist between the factors leading to contract use in 
the organic and conventional sectors. Future research might also examine 
sectors, such as poultry, where contracts dominate the conventional sector but 
are rarely used in the organic sector. Information on the use of contracts by 
intermediaries in the conventional sector is not currently available—nearly 
all research focuses on contracting from the producer’s perspective. 
Whether the share of certiﬁ  ed organic handlers using contracts continues to 
decline will depend on the interplay of many factors. First, the industry is 
adapting to the recent slowing of demand growth. For nearly 15 years, the 
industry has operated on a model that anticipates approximately 20 percent 
growth per annum, with periodic severe product shortages. The organic market 
now appears—for the ﬁ  rst time—to be affected by the same cyclical conditions 
that face the entire agricultural sector. Growth in retail sales between 2007 
and 2008 was 12 percent, and growth between 2008 and 2009 was even lower, 
at 5 percent (Nutrition Business Journal, 2010). As growth in the organic 
market slows in response to changing macroeconomic conditions, handlers 
and suppliers must adapt their business strategies, including procurement and 20
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contracting, to remain proﬁ  table through downturns in the business cycle. 
Changing expectations about future supply needs may result in changes in the 
frequency of contract usage, as well as different contract terms. Such changes 
are visible in the terms of organic milk contracts, which were subject to tempo-
rary mandatory quota reductions in early 2010, which have since eased. These 
changes in contract terms were implemented by one major milk processor 
speciﬁ  cally to reduce supply to prevent a decline in organic milk prices. 
However, the impact of these changes on the use of contracts in the organic 
sector is not predictable. Handlers may increase their reliance on contracts, 
in order to ensure they secure an adequate supply of top quality products. It 
is equally plausible that handlers may seek to contract for fewer products and 
rely on the spot market instead. Whether these changing market realities in 
the organic sector result in a widespread increase or decrease in contracting is 
an empirical question that can only be answered over time. 21
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Appendix: Contract Data
Appendix table 1 







Seasonal  35 19
Yearly 47 59
Pricing terms:
Flat price 38 33
Organic market price NA 30
Negotiated at time of transaction 41 37
Quantity discount 12 44
Quality premium 54 41
Penalty for low quality 44 15
Prices depend on past performance 13 *
Fixed price plus quality premium NA 11
Measurement of delivered quality:
Observe quality 39 59
Test quality 78 78
Third-party certiﬁ  cation 22 30
USDA grades 36 30
Payment terms:
Payment on delivery 85 44
Payment after speciﬁ  ed number of days NA 59
Standard clauses:
Veriﬁ  cation of certiﬁ  cation 97 85
Minimum quality standards 85 85
Output of speciﬁ  ed number of acres 36 33
Reject if contract terms not met 79 74
Automatic contract renewal 15 *
Other action if terms not met 61 59
Delivery place 81 78
Delivery time 64 59
Best management practices 13 11
Exclusive supply 17 *
NA= data were not collected in 2004. 
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.25
The Role of Contracts in the Organic Supply Chain: 2004 and 2007 / EIB-69 
Economic Research Service/USDA
Appendix table 2







Seasonal  40 44
Yearly 38 46
Pricing terms:
Flat price 56 39
Organic market price NA 32
Negotiated at time of transaction 27 24
Quantity discount 36 24
Quality premium 26 10
Penalty for low quality 39 39
Prices depend on past performance 14 *
Fixed price plus quality premium NA 10
Measurement of delivered quality:
Observe quality 57 59
Test quality 61 76
Third-party certiﬁ  cation 37 27
USDA grades 46 29
Payment terms:
Payment on delivery 61 41
Payment after speciﬁ  ed number of days NA 59
Standard clauses:
Veriﬁ  cation of certiﬁ  cation 88 93
Minimum quality standards 78 80
Output of speciﬁ  ed number of acres 34 34
Reject if contract terms not met 72 71
Automatic contract renewal * *
Other action if terms not met 55 39
Delivery place 84 76
Delivery time 76 61
Best management practices 30 22
Exclusive supply 21 *
NA= data were not collected in 2004. 
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.26
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Seasonal  32 26
Yearly 54 51
Pricing terms:
Flat price 45 32
Organic market price NA 27
Negotiated at time of transaction 35 41
Quantity discount 28 11
Quality premium 27 19
Penalty for low quality 36 30
Prices depend on past performance 17 *
Fixed price plus quality premium NA *
Measurement of delivered quality:
Observe quality 71 68
Test quality 83 70
Third-party certiﬁ  cation 36 35
USDA grades 24 24
Payment terms:
Payment on delivery 67 49
Payment after speciﬁ  ed number of days NA 38
Standard clauses:
Veriﬁ  cation of certiﬁ  cation 89 95
Minimum quality standards 87 84
Output of speciﬁ  ed number of acres 36 32
Reject if contract terms not met 72 68
Automatic contract renewal * *
Other action if terms not met 50 43
Delivery place 71 73
Delivery time 68 70
Best management practices 13 19
Exclusive supply 23 *
NA= data were not collected in 2004. 
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.27
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Appendix table 4










Flat price 44 22
Organic market price NA 17
Negotiated at time of transaction 23 13
Quantity discount 16 *
Quality premium 34 43
Penalty for low quality 21 30
Prices depend on past performance * *
Fixed price plus quality premium NA 30
Measurement of delivered quality:
Observe quality 33 22
Test quality 69 74
Third-party certiﬁ  cation 24 *
USDA grades 11 13
Payment terms:
Payment on delivery 49 *
Payment after speciﬁ  ed number of days NA 87
Standard clauses:
Veriﬁ  cation of certiﬁ  cation 78 87
Minimum quality standards 73 78
Output of speciﬁ  ed number of acres 13 *
Reject if contract terms not met 66 70
Automatic contract renewal 36 26
Other action if terms not met 32 43
Delivery place 59 57
Delivery time 47 48
Best management practices 23 17
Exclusive supply 28 13
NA= data were not collected in 2004. 
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.28
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Flat price 35 22
Organic market price NA 33
Negotiated at time of transaction 35 22
Quantity discount 23 33
Quality premium 27 33
Penalty for low quality 30 50
Prices depend on past performance * 17
Fixed price plus quality premium NA *
Measurement of delivered quality:
Observe quality 57 44
Test quality 43 56
Third-party certiﬁ  cation 13 22
USDA grades 35 17
Payment terms:
Payment on delivery 49 *
Payment after speciﬁ  ed number of days NA 61
Standard clauses:
Veriﬁ  cation of certiﬁ  cation 91 83
Minimum quality standards 75 67
Output of speciﬁ  ed number of acres 25 22
Reject if contract terms not met 75 61
Automatic contract renewal 10 *
Other action if terms not met 40 28
Delivery place 70 56
Delivery time 57 56
Best management practices 17 17
Exclusive supply **
NA= data were not collected in 2004. 
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.29
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Seasonal  50 25
Yearly 32 63
Pricing terms:
Flat price 32 29
Organic market price NA 13
Negotiated at time of transaction 27 33
Quantity discount 19 25
Quality premium 24 21
Penalty for low quality 30 25
Prices depend on past performance * *
Fixed price plus quality premium NA *
Measurement of delivered quality:
Observe quality 64 46
Test quality 45 46
Third-party certiﬁ  cation 27 17
USDA grades 50 38
Payment terms:
Payment on delivery 41 33
Payment after speciﬁ  ed number of days NA 50
Standard clauses:
Veriﬁ  cation of certiﬁ  cation 73 88
Minimum quality standards 81 71
Output of speciﬁ  ed number of acres 19 13
Reject if contract terms not met 48 67
Automatic contract renewal 15 17
Other action if terms not met 35 33
Delivery place 70 58
Delivery time 67 46
Best management practices 25 *
Exclusive supply **
NA= data were not collected in 2004. 
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.30
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Seasonal  45 23
Yearly 33 55
Pricing terms:
Flat price 16 12
Organic market price NA 65
Negotiated at time of transaction 44 *
Quantity discount 22 15
Quality premium 31 15
Penalty for low quality 37 19
Prices depend on past performance * *
Fixed price plus quality premium NA *
Measurement of delivered quality:
Observe quality 67 50
Test quality 55 46
Third-party certiﬁ  cation * 31
USDA grades 21 42
Payment terms:
Payment on delivery 39 19
Payment after speciﬁ  ed number of days NA 38
Standard clauses:
Veriﬁ  cation of certiﬁ  cation 71 65
Minimum quality standards 72 46
Output of speciﬁ  ed number of acres * *
Reject if contract terms not met 33 50
Automatic contract renewal 24 31
Other action if terms not met 36 31
Delivery place 57 38
Delivery time 46 27
Best management practices 19 23
Exclusive supply **
NA= data were not collected in 2004. 
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.31
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Seasonal  41 41
Yearly 18 22
Pricing terms:
Flat price 18 13
Organic market price NA 47
Negotiated at time of transaction 40 24
Quantity discount 30 18
Quality premium 38 38
Penalty for low quality 11 *
Prices depend on past performance 15 10
Fixed price plus quality premium NA 19
Measurement of delivered quality:
Observe quality 66 46
Test quality 78 85
Third-party certiﬁ  cation 36 27
USDA grades 11 *
Payment terms:
Payment on delivery 75 44
Payment after speciﬁ  ed number of days NA 48
Standard clauses:
Veriﬁ  cation of certiﬁ  cation 83 75
Minimum quality standards 73 54
Output of speciﬁ  ed number of acres * *
Reject if contract terms not met 73 51
Automatic contract renewal * *
Other action if terms not met 36 16
Delivery place 54 44
Delivery time 64 49
Best management practices 16 15
Exclusive supply **
NA= data were not collected in 2004. 
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.32
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Seasonal  22 14
Yearly 44 57
Pricing terms:
Flat price 25 43
Organic market price NA 29
Negotiated at time of transaction 13 *
Quantity discount 11 21
Quality premium 22 *
Penalty for low quality 33 14
Prices depend on past performance 11 *
Fixed price plus quality premium NA *
Measurement of delivered quality:
Observe quality 38 57
Test quality 38 43
Third-party certiﬁ  cation 13 29
USDA grades 50 36
Payment terms:
Payment on delivery 89 50
Payment after speciﬁ  ed number of days NA 36
Standard clauses:
Veriﬁ  cation of certiﬁ  cation 75 86
Minimum quality standards 50 64
Output of speciﬁ  ed number of acres 22 *
Reject if contract terms not met 44 64
Automatic contract renewal 13 14
Other action if terms not met 56 50
Delivery place 100 57
Delivery time 75 36
Best management practices 44 21
Exclusive supply 22 *
NA= data were not collected in 2004. 
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.33
The Role of Contracts in the Organic Supply Chain: 2004 and 2007 / EIB-69 
Economic Research Service/USDA
Appendix table 10







Seasonal  41 31
Yearly 48 54
Pricing terms:
Flat price 67 *
Organic market price 40
Negotiated at time of transaction 11 27
Quantity discount 20 47
Quality premium 24 27
Penalty for low quality 52 33
Prices depend on past performance 21 13
Fixed price plus quality premium NA 13
Measurement of delivered quality:
Observe quality 50 53
Test quality 65 80
Third-party certiﬁ  cation 15 53
USDA grades 19 13
Payment terms:
Payment on delivery 54 20
Payment after speciﬁ  ed number of days NA 73
Standard clauses:
Veriﬁ  cation of certiﬁ  cation 71 87
Minimum quality standards 88 80
Output of speciﬁ  ed number of acres 55 47
Reject if contract terms not met 83 47
Automatic contract renewal * 13
Other action if terms not met 40 33
Delivery place 81 53
Delivery time 62 53
Best management practices 30 20
Exclusive supply 26 13
NA= data were not collected in 2004. 
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.34
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Seasonal  41 31
Yearly 48 54
Pricing terms:
Flat price 43 26
Organic market price NA 21
Negotiated at time of transaction 17 21
Quantity discount 10 *
Quality premium 22 26
Penalty for low quality 42 26
Prices depend on past performance 11 26
Fixed price plus quality premium NA 16
Measurement of delivered quality:
Observe quality 17 37
Test quality 61 58
Third-party certiﬁ  cation * 21
USDA grades 26 21
Payment terms:
Payment on delivery 22 26
Payment after speciﬁ  ed number of days NA 74
Standard clauses:
Veriﬁ  cation of certiﬁ  cation 77 89
Minimum quality standards 64 79
Output of speciﬁ  ed number of acres 55 68
Reject if contract terms not met 62 53
Automatic contract renewal 41 32
Other action if terms not met 39 42
Delivery place 64 79
Delivery time 40 53
Best management practices 37 37
Exclusive supply 12 *
NA= data were not collected in 2004. 
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.35
The Role of Contracts in the Organic Supply Chain: 2004 and 2007 / EIB-69 
Economic Research Service/USDA
Appendix table 12







Seasonal  45 43
Yearly 45 29
Pricing terms:
Flat price 36 14
Organic market price NA 29
Negotiated at time of transaction 64 36
Quantity discount * *
Quality premium * 21
Penalty for low quality 18 21
Prices depend on past performance * 14
Fixed price plus quality premium NA *
Measurement of delivered quality:
Observe quality 45 71
Test quality 73 57
Third-party certiﬁ  cation 27 21
USDA grades 18 29
Payment terms:
Payment on delivery 91 36
Payment after speciﬁ  ed number of days NA 43
Standard clauses:
Veriﬁ  cation of certiﬁ  cation 82 79
Minimum quality standards 73 64
Output of speciﬁ  ed number of acres 20 14
Reject if contract terms not met 80 57
Automatic contract renewal 11 21
Other action if terms not met 44 43
Delivery place 82 64
Delivery time 70 36
Best management practices 20 14
Exclusive supply **
NA= data were not collected in 2004. 
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.36
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Seasonal  21 24
Yearly 57 65
Pricing terms:
Flat price 43 47
Organic market price NA 24
Negotiated at time of transaction 29 29
Quantity discount 21 35
Quality premium 21 18
Penalty for low quality 21 12
Prices depend on past performance * *
Fixed price plus quality premium NA *
Measurement of delivered quality:
Observe quality 64 47
Test quality 50 82
Third-party certiﬁ  cation 21 35
USDA grades 36 47
Payment terms:
Payment on delivery 62 35
Payment after speciﬁ  ed number of days NA 59
Standard clauses:
Veriﬁ  cation of certiﬁ  cation 85 82
Minimum quality standards 77 71
Output of speciﬁ  ed number of acres 31 24
Reject if contract terms not met 69 65
Automatic contract renewal * *
Other action if terms not met 42 41
Delivery place 85 76
Delivery time 54 41
Best management practices 23 24
Exclusive supply **
NA= data were not collected in 2004. 
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.37
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Seasonal  100 50
Yearly 05 0
Pricing terms:
Flat price 33 54
Organic market price NA 15
Negotiated at time of transaction 17 15
Quantity discount 33 15
Quality premium 17 38
Penalty for low quality 67 31
Prices depend on past performance  * 23
Fixed price plus quality premium NA 15
Measurement of delivered quality:
Observe quality 50 62
Test quality 33 46
Third-party certiﬁ  cation 17 15
USDA grades 17 46
Payment terms:
Payment on delivery 50 *
Payment after speciﬁ  ed number of days NA 69
Standard clauses:
Veriﬁ  cation of certiﬁ  cation 83 85
Minimum quality standards 100 85
Output of speciﬁ  ed number of acres 67 62
Reject if contract terms not met 80 62
Automatic contract renewal * *
Other action if terms not met 67 46
Delivery place 100 85
Delivery time 67 62
Best management practices 40 15
Exclusive supply 20 23
NA= data were not collected in 2004. 
* Indicates that less than 10 percent of handlers reported using a speciﬁ  c clause or term. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.